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In their recent Article on the deferral policy of the National
Labor Relations Board (Board or NLRB),1 two attorneys for
the United Auto Workers (UAW), Leonard Page and Daniel
W. Sherrick, argue that the Board has adopted "an indefensi-
ble double standard"2 by applying its policy of "deferral to
arbitration" only to contractual dispute resolution processes
but not to intraunion review procedures.3 By deferring to
intraunion procedures, they contend, the Board would further
many of the same policy objectives it now achieves by
deferring to arbitration,4 with the added benefit of advancing
the interest in democratic union self-government.5 Moreover,
by drawing analogies to exhaustion rules developed for
judicial proceedings to enforce the Landrum-Griffin Act and
the duty of fair representation (DFR), Page and Sherrick
contend that such deferral would appropriately prevent
unions from being charged until the highest levels of the
union have had the opportunity to decide whether to correct
the wrongdoing.6 However, the reasons they present for their
proposal are not persuasive.
First, it is not clear whether Page and Sherrick propose to
extend only the Collyer7 doctrine of pre-arbitral deferral to
section 8(b)(1)(A) charges, or whether they would apply the
* B.A., Reed College, 1973; J.D., University of Chicago, 1976. Attorney, Public
Citizen Litigation Group. I am grateful to Arthur L. Fox II and Alan B. Morrison for
their comments to drafts of this Response. The views expressed here, like those in my
previous Article, are of course my own and not necessarily those of the Litigation
Group.
1. Leonard Page & Daniel W. Sherrick, The NLRB's Deferral Policy and Union
Reform: A Union Perspective, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 647 (1991).
2. Id. at 687.
3. Id- at 682-87.
4. I& at 684.
5. Id. at 684, 687.
6. Id at 685-86.
7. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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Spielberg doctrine of post-arbitral deferral as well.9 On the
one hand, much of the Page and Sherrick discussion pertains
to "exhaustion,"10 a term that connotes only deferral to a
procedure from which the employee may return to the Board
for a de novo hearing once the procedure is completed.
Moreover, in support of their argument, they invoke section
411(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (LMRDA) and Clayton v. International Union,
UAW, 12 both of which provide only for a delay in the litiga-
tion of claims without according any preclusive effect to the
outcome of intraunion appeals."3 On the other hand, however,
the Article invokes "the Board's Spielberg-Collyer rationale," 4
implying that Spielberg deference is also desired.
The question of whether the Board should defer to the out-
come of the appeal is significant because the Board has
consistently justified the Collyer doctrine by pointing out that
it does not exist in isolation, but instead channels unfair
labor practice (ULP) claims into a procedure that will
normally resolve them, subject to limited review for com-
pliance with the Spielberg standards."5 Where, by contrast,
8. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
9. For a discussion of the two lines of cases, see Paul Alan Levy, Deferral and the
Dissident, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 479, 494-506 (1991).
10. Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 684-86.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
12. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1988) ("No labor organization shall limit the right of any
member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any
administrative agency ... : Provided, That any such member may be required to
exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time)
within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against
such organizations or any officer thereof."); Clayton, 451 U.S. at 693 (arguing that
exhaustion would fail to lead to "significant savings in judicial resources, because
regardless of the outcome of the internal appeal, the employee would be required to
prove de novo in his § 301 suit" that the union breached its DFR).
14. Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 684; see also id. at 686 n.179 (citing Olin
Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984), as a form of deferral that the Board fails to extend to
intraunion procedures).
15. In Collyer itself, for example, the Board decided to require deferral to the
grievance procedure precisely because it anticipated that the dispute would be
"resolved" by arbitrators. Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 841-42 (stating that the award
presumably will be valid under Spielberg) (citing Schlitz Brewing Corp., 175 N.L.R.B.
141,142 (1969)). Similarly, in National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972), the Board
explained that, in expanding Collyer to a new class of cases, "[tihe crucial determinant
is... the reasonableness of the assumption that the arbitration procedure will resolve
this dispute in a manner consistent with the standards of Spielberg." Id. at 531; see
also United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984) (explaining that the
Collyer standard was based on a "reasonable belief that arbitration procedures would
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a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) fails to provide for
final and binding arbitration that either party can invoke,
the Collyer doctrine does not apply.' In other words, Collyer
generally does not require that a case be submitted to a
specified procedure when the only effect will be "exhaustion,"
that is, a delay in the submission of the case to the Board.
As further explicated in their Response to my original
Article, Page and Sherrick ask that "weight" be given to the
results of an intraunion appeal'-not a presumption of
preclusive effect, as under Spielberg, but a greater or lesser
degree of evidentiary weight, much as federal courts some-
times weigh arbitral awards in resolving a Title VII 8 or a
Fair Labor Standards Act' 9 suit. But it seems highly unlikely
that the Board would or could accord such weight to the
outcome of an intraunion appeal, not to mention giving it any
preclusive or presumptive effect. Unlike arbitration proce-
dures, intraunion appeals do not produce a decision either by
neutrals or by persons appointed by an entity whose interests
are aligned with those of the employee.2' Even where the
"arbitration" procedure takes place before a joint committee,
as with the Teamsters,' the employee enjoys the theoretical
protection that the interest of the union, which appoints half
of the members of the committee, is aligned with the interest
of the employee on the statutory issue (or the parallel
contractual issue) being remitted to arbitration. 22 Intraunion
resolve the dispute in a manner consistent with the criteria of Spielberg" (quoting
General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 817 (1977) (Members Penello and
Walther, dissenting))).
16. Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 106, 106 n.1 (1972),
enforced, 84 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2300 (10th Cir. 1973); see also District No. 10, Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (Ladish Co.), 200 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1160 n.4 (1972).
17. Leonard Page & Daniel W. Sherrick, Further Thoughts on Deferral to Private
Dispute Resolution Procedures: A Response, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 925, 942-43 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 n.22
(1981).
20. See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, The Framework ofDenocracy in Union Government,
32 CATH. U. L. REV. 13, 67-68 (1982).
21. See generally Levy, supra note 9, at 552-60.
22. Page and Sherrick take me to task for my criticisms of the joint committee,
suggesting that I necessarily favor a UAW-style bureaucratic "contractualism" over a
wholly power-based grievance procedure, a policy choice that they say should be left to
the union. Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 937-38. For additional discussion of
contractualism, see STAUGHTON LYND, SOLIDARITY UNIONISM (1992). My experience as a
lawyer for Teamster reformers, my reading of the literature, and my experience of
seeing clients and friends severely mistreated by the Teamster grievance procedure
have made me deeply suspicious of it. Whatever theoretical attractions the notion of
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appeals, on the other hand, are conducted before officials of
the union (i.e., the very "interested" party being charged with
a ULP), who presumably will be inclined to uphold the
union's conduct to avoid any back-pay liability that the union
might otherwise incur.' The Board does not even apply
Collyer when the final decision in the grievance procedure is
left to the party against whom the ULP charge has been
filed.2
The UAW's Public Review Board (PRB) arguably puts that
union in a stronger position to seek post-appeal deference
because PRB decisions are rendered by a group of distin-
guished individuals who work neither for the union nor for
any employer with which it bargains.25 But even the PRB's
a "power-based" approach to grievance adjustment may have, the fact remains that the
Teamsters virtually never strike over grievances. It remains to be seen whether the
Teamsters' internal reform slate will sufficiently change the grievance procedure so as
to ameliorate these problems.
In my original Article, supra note 9, I argue against deferral of statutory rights to
joint committee decisions. Contrary to what Page and Sherrick seem to think, see Page
& Sherrick, supra note 17, at 937, my original Article does not argue against deference
to joint committee decisions in the case where the rights at stake were created by the
labor agreement itself. How the joint committee decisions should be analyzed when
contractual rights are at stake presents a somewhat different question. Although my
Article paid little attention to this question, much of Page and Sherrick's refutation of
my thesis seems to be based on the false assumption that the Article is about "deferral"
in the context of enforcing contractual rights. As my Article states, the DFR is the only
protection that employees have when their contractual rights are at stake. It is impor-
tant that the DFR be applied to the actions of the union officials who make decisions
on grievances-i.e., the union representatives on the grievance panels-rather than just
to the union advocates who appear before those panels. As I indicate in my Article, the
courts are just beginning to recognize the need for such an extension of the DFR to both
groups of union representatives. Levy, supra note 9, at 566-67.
23. Under the Letters of Agreement that allow the UAW to reinstate cases in the
grievance procedure if its appellate process, including the Public Review Board (PRB),
finds that the grievance was properly withdrawn, see Page & Sherrick, supra note 1,
at 683, the employer is exempted from any back-pay liability for the period of time
between the dropping of the grievance and its reinstatement, see, e.g., AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION AND THE UAW 383 (Sept. 21,1984). The union's
decision to reinstate the grievance is tantamount to an admission that there was a
breach of the DFR, and thus, given both the union's agreement not to hold the employer
liable for this period of time and the division of responsibility for damages set forth in
Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 222-30 (1983), the union becomes
liable for the back pay during this period of time.
. 24. NFL Management Council, 203 N.L.R.B. 958, 958-59 (1973), enforcement
denied on other grounds sub norn. NFL Players Ass'n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 15-17 (8th
Cir. 1974); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. 812,819-20 (1973) (ALJ decision),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 506 F.2d 668, 669 (4th Cir. 1974).
25. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUIOMOBIL, AEROSPACE & AGROICLIURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST. art. 32, § 1 (1989) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 683 & n.162.
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members are appointed by the union, 2 and its decisions
reflect extreme deference to the union's elected officials.
Indeed, although I do not have a statistical breakdown, I
subscribe to the PRB's decisions and rarely see PRB decisions
overturning the union's actions. Although this is arguably
because the UAW's behavior is normally above reproach,2 7 it
hardly seems likely that a union would select an arbitrator
who almost always rules in favor of employers. Hence, even
the PRB's "neutrality" is open to question.
And yet, unless the NLRB were willing to defer to a
decision of the union's highest appellate body that the union
did no wrong, in most cases extending Collyer to intraunion
appeals would not lead to the resolution of duty of fair
representation claims, but would only delay their resolution
by the Board. After all, an intraunion appellate body has at
least two reasons for rejecting the argument that the union
breached the DFR: (1) it may decide that the union did not
breach the agreement; or (2) it may decide that, regardless of
whether the agreement was breached, the lower union body
Many courts and commentators have expressed their respect for the PRB. See, e.g.,
Monroe v. International Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting the
membership of a former judge of that court on the PRB); Public Review Board and
UAW Democracy, UNION DEMOCRACY IN ACTION 5-7 (1964).
26. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNFIE AUIOMOBII, AEROSPACE & AGRICUL URAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST. art. 32, § 2 (1989) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
27. A few years ago, I should not have hesitated to embrace the common
assumption that the UAW, if not perfect, was at least far more democratic and tolerant
of dissent than most other national unions. The reactions of the Administration Caucus
over the past few years, however, as it has been faced with a substantial and enduring
insurgent movement for the first time in a generation, make me wonder whether the
union is indeed more democratic, or simply more lucky and better at co-opting dissent.
Page and Sherrick disagree with my perceptions in this regard. See Page &
Sherrick, supra note 17, at 928 & n.15. However, we have agreed that, rather than
divert attention from the topic at hand with a lengthy debate about the state of
democracy in the UAW and disagreements about how to characterize various events
and the authority that reports them, we will simply note our disagreement in this
regard.
Page and Sherrick also take me to task for my use of the phrase "better at co-opting
dissent" in the first paragraph of this footnote. Id. at 928 n.15. They miss my point.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with responding to intraunion dissent by co-opting
dissenters and compromising on issues that motivate dissatisfaction. I agree with Page
and Sherrick that this is a healthy response by union leaders. If, however, the leaders'
failure to compromise with a particular group of dissenters, or the dissenters'
unwillingness to be co-opted, produces undemocratic responses-if, as Justice Harlan
said in another context, the leadership responds to persistent dissent by displaying the
"fist inside the velvet glove," NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409
(1964)-then observers may be justified in wondering whether the union is able to
function democratically only in times of relative consensus.
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did not behave improperly. Because the NLRB gives no
deference to either of these decisions, applying Collyer
merely would cause delay.
Only when the intraunion procedure upholds the position
of the employee and leads to the reinstatement of the
grievance can Collyer deferral produce results that resolve
the DFR claim. This may be because the grievance procedure
then continues and culminates in a binding arbitration. If
the arbitrator rules that the employer did not breach the
CBA, the appeals process would have produced a construction
or application of the CBA to which the Board presumably
would defer, thus defeating the DFR claim.2 If, on the other
hand, the arbitrator decides that the CBA was violated, the
decision presumably eliminates the first of the employee's
two legal hurdles noted above. If the basis for reinstating.
the grievance was that the DFR had been violated, that may
well eliminate the second hurdle, thus giving the Board a
basis for proceeding directly to the question of relief for the
employee.
But, if I am correct in my observation that, even when a
"neutral" body like' the PRB makes the decisions, most
appeals would uphold the decision of the union below, then
it follows that in most cases, months or even years later the
parties would be left almost exactly where they were before
the appeal. Thus, unless there was a good reason for the
Board to apply a naked exhaustion requirement, a matter
which I discuss below,2 the rationale underlying Collyer
simply does not extend to intraunion appeals.
Nor do I accept Page and Sherrick's contention that
adoption of an exhaustion requirement is needed to further
the public interest in union democracy.3 ° I agree with Page
28. If, however, after the grievance is reinstated, the union later drops the
grievance, there is nothing to which the Board can defer.
29. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
30. See Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 684, 687. I join Page and Sherrick in
wishing that the Board would be more attentive to union democracy concerns, rather
than sloughing them off in the interest of stability in relations between corporate
managers and union officials. In a number of areas the Board has been overly
concerned with protecting union institutions at the expense of dissident members. For
example, the NLRB traditionally has held that an intraunion requirement that
contracts be ratified by the membership may be ignored unless the union and employer
expressly agree during the negotiations that the requirement be observed, see Alan
Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 801-04 (1984), although
several lengthy concurrences by Board Chairman Stephens suggest that this rule may
be in flux. See, e.g., Beatrice/Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 137 L.R.R.M.
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and Sherrick that intraunion appeals can promote some
democratic values. But there are ways that an exhaustion
requirement can hinder these values as well. First, an
exhaustion requirement inevitably imposes costs on the
affected union member. Not only is she forced to wait for
relief against an alleged violation of her rights, but there is
always the danger, as the Supreme Court has noted, that
"the member [will] become exhausted, instead of the reme-
dies."3' Because the consequent burden on DFR claimants
undermines the DFR as a "bulwark to prevent arbitrary
union conduct,"32 an exhaustion requirement, by its very
nature, imposes costs on union democracy. These costs must
be weighed against the benefits when deciding whether to
require exhaustion in a particular context.
Second, when members are forced to submit their conten-
tions that a local union has wrongly failed to pursue a
grievance under the CBA to a higher union body, the power
to decide what the CBA means passes, in effect, from the
local union to the higher body. Some unions, such as the
UAW, may value the creation of a highly bureaucratic system
for deciding the precise meaning of each clause in a CBA and
may want to give international representatives the final
decision-making power. While this certainly has been the
historic trend in the labor movement, 33 other unions may
come to different conclusions.
34
(BNA) 1075, 1076-79 (1991); Sierra Publishing Co., 296 N.L.R.B. 477, 477-82 (1989),
132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1189, 1189-94 (1989). Similarly, the Board has consistently re-
fused to extend the reach of section 8(bXIXA) to forbid union restrictions of the right
to post reform literature at the workplace as it has forbidden employers under section
8(a)(1). But see Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the union
committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to allow an employee to post
materials critical of the union on the union bulletin board). The Board has not acqui-
esced in the D.C. Circuit's rejection of its position, and consequently the General
Counsel refuses to issue complaints in these cases, effectively rendering the Helton
opinion a nullity. Indeed, the Board's failure to reexamine the Teamster joint
committees, as well as its narrow approach to finding conflicts between the union
grievance advocate and the dissenting employee, see Levy, supra note 9, at 489, 493-94
& n.66, 560-69, reflect the insufficient attention it gives to the impact of its rulings on
union democracy.
31. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418,
425 (1968); accord Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 693 & n.22
(1981).
32. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
33. See Paul A. Levy, Legal Responses to Rank-and-File Dissent: Restrictions on
Union Officer Autonomy, 30 BUFF. L. REV. 663, 668-69 (1981).
34. For example, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Clayton v.
International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981), the Teamsters amended the
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Third, intraunion appeal mechanisms may have the para-
doxical effect of facilitating unfair treatment of members by
union officials. After all, one of the most important purposes
of the DFR is to encourage local union officials to handle
grievances carefully. Intraunion appeal mechanisms may
weaken that incentive by allowing the initial grievance han-
dlers to believe that they need not be so careful; if they
behave improperly, they can count on being corrected by the
appeals process without subjecting the union to any liability.
Moreover, the appeals process may give union lawyers (who,
after all, tend to write the decisions of union appellate
bodies) the opportunity to craft viable explanations for an
action of lower level union officials whose actual motives
were improper. The Board generally holds that explanations
developed after a decision do not provide a sufficient defense
to a charged unfair labor practice; the issue is not whether a
respondent could have acted for lawful reasons, but whether
it did act for lawful reasons.' By the same token, the Board
should not allow the union to substitute the appellate "deci-
sion" for the actual reasons (or lack of reasons) of the union
official who decided not to pursue the grievance. If Page and
Sherrick are correct in stating that the union's breach of the
DFR is not final until its appellate bodies have had the
opportunity to address the alleged violation,' then the
exhaustion requirement would become a way for the union to
substitute a lawyer's rationalization for the union official's
true reasons for dropping a member's grievance.
Fourth, the most effective appeal mechanism may well
involve an independent body, as the UAW's PRB is supposed
to be, whose members are truly neutral and whose decisions,
like the awards of many arbitrators, often include sophisti-
cated reasoning. Such a body admittedly is less likely to be
constitution to require intraunion exhaustion in collective-bargaining matters.
INTERNAIONAL BRSYtERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, PROPOSED CONsmVInON AND BY-LAWS 102-03
(1981). Five years later, the old rule, which excluded collective-bargaining matters from
this requirement, was reinstated. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CONST. OF
1986 art. XIX, § 12(c).
35. See Hamilton Plastics, 291 N.L.R.B. 529, 532 (1988) (refusing to consider
"afterthoughts" that were not originally given as reasons for discharge); Wright Line,
251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1091 & n.20 (1980) (finding that work record discrepancies
discovered after the decision to eliminate an employee suggested a predetermined plan
rather than a lawful reason for discharging the employee), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981).
36. See Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 684-85.
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influenced either by intraunion political considerations or by
the possibility of union financial liability if it were to decide
that a particular grievance should have been pursued.
Moreover, if the union has decided to entrust to such an
independent body the power to second-guess the performance
of its disciplinary and grievance adjusting functions to
ensure that its members are not abused for political reasons,
that decision may genuinely promote union democracy.
On the other hand, unless the independent body is empow-
ered to review grievance decisions on some basis broader
than the DFR itself, it is hard to see what democratic gains
are achieved by substituting an unelected, self-perpetuating
body of outsiders for the NLRB, whose members are, after
all, appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate.37 The PRB, for example, may have even less
authority than the Board over alleged mishandling of
grievances because it may intervene only if the reason for
dropping the grievance was based on fraud, discrimination,
or collusion with management, or was utterly devoid of a
rational basis. Nor, indeed, does it claim to have authority
to provide interpretations of the CBA itself.39 Thus, balancing
37. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1988). Arguably, the very presence of the PRB may induce
the elected union tribunals to extend better protectiQns to members on their own. For
example, an early study found that, based on a small number of cases, the proportion
of intraunion appeals in which the UAW's executive board reversed local union
discipline increased dramatically in the year following the establishme:at of the PRB.
JACK STIEBER, GOVERNING THE UAW 82-83 (1962). However, the availability of judicial
or administrative mechanisms of redress may have the same effect. If the PRB's power
to intervene is no greater, it is not clear that its existence would, in fact, increase the
protection afforded members in grievance handling.
38. INTERNA'IONAL UNION, UNIED AUtlMOBILE, AEMSPACE & AGRICULWRAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST. art. 33, § 4(i) (1989). Before Clayton v. International
Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981), the PRB did not even have authority over rational
basis claims. Arthur L. Fox & Robert B. Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of
Intra- Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1008-09 (1980).
It was, presumably, in response to the Supreme Court's criticism of this narrow focus,
which excluded even some claims that were plainly covered by the DFR as enunciated
in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), see Clayton, 451 U.S. at 694 n.24, that the PRB's
jurisdiction was expanded slightly to include rational basis claims. This approach,
however, represents the most cautious union-side interpretation of the reach of the DFR
and certainly does not give the PRB any authority beyond that which already is
accorded to the Board and the courts under the DFR.
39. Rather, the PRB takes the position that this task belongs to the elected bodies
of the union. See, e.g., Morris v. Local 549, PRB Case No. 922, at 8 (1991); Hayden v.
UAW Agricultural Implement Dep't, PRB Case No. 913, at 4 (1990); Hein v. Local 653,
PRB Case No. 746, at 5 (1986); Robinson v. Local 92,4 PRB Decisions 364,366 (1985)
Guncsaga v. Local 846, 3 PRB Decisions 315, 318 (1982). However reasonable this may
be as a matter of democratic theory, it is hard to understand how Page and Sherrick
can argue that the PRB's decisions may provide a construction of CBA that may help
resolve the ULP charge against the union.
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the pluses and minuses for union democracy caused by an
NLRB rule requiring exhaustion of intraunion remedies, and
considering the delay that such an exhaustion requirement
entails, I am not persuaded that the interests of union
democracy favor the Page and Sherrick proposal.
This brings me to a curious aspect of their proposal. Al-
though their proposal is limited, by its terms, to ULP
charges involving the DFR,'0 most of their arguments would
apply equally to other kinds of charges that members might
bring against their unions; yet Page and Sherrick never
explain why they limit their proposal to DFR cases. For
example, if the possibility of reversal of the union position
deprives the union's breach of the DFR of some requisite
"ripeness,"4 1 the same could be said about other forms of
union discrimination against reformers that are actionable
under section 8(b)(1)(A) or, indeed, section 8(b)(2). 2 So, too,
does the analogy with the exhaustion proviso of section
101(aX4) of the LMRDA43 apply to other kinds of ULP charges.
The only argument that may not extend beyond DFR cases
is that the appeal process may produce a conclusive interpre-
tation of the CBA that resolves the DFR claim. That
argument is the key to the contention that unions are being
deprived unfairly of the benefits that the Collyer deferral
doctrine provides to employers. But, as we have seen, that
argument provides little support even for the exhaustion of
DFR charges.
Indeed, the exhaustion argument actually may extend to
all deferrable ULP claims against employers as well as
unions. After all, the theory is that if the charging party
pursued an intraunion appeal of the denial of a grievance,
the grievance might be reinstated and an arbitral resolution
of its claim, including an authoritative construction of the
CBA to which the Board would then defer under Olin,4'
might be obtained. But employers charged with ULPs under
section 8(a)(3), for example, also could benefit from such an
interpretation, and so, although Page and Sherrick do not
40. Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 951.
41. Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 685.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee
who is denied union membership).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 411(aX4) (1988); Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 685-86.
44. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) (holding that the Board will defer
unless the arbitrator's award is "palpably wrong").
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mention it, their proposal could be invoked by employers to
avoid the current rule that if the union refuses the individ-
ual employee's request to pursue the grievance, Collyer de-
ferral is no longer appropriate.4 And the Clayton doctrine,
on which they rely to support their exhaustion proposal, is
equally available to employers and unions.46
In their haste to avoid Professor St. Antoine's charge that
their proposal is an example of "special pleading,"47 their
Response acknowledges that the principles could extend "to
any process of private dispute resolution."" This standard,
which would be just as applicable to a dispute resolution
procedure established unilaterally by an unorganized em-
ployer as it would to an intraunion appeals mechanism,"
takes Page and Sherrick far beyond the Collyer/Spielberg
doctrine that was the original basis for both their proposal
and their charge of a "double standard" between employers
and unions. In summary, then, the "exhaustion" analogy
does not support their proposal, both because the reasons
they give for it are insufficient and because the argument
proves too much.'
45. Levy, supra note 9, at 505-06.
46. Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 694-95 (1981).
47. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Introduction to Symposium, The Government and
Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 469, 475 (1991).
48. Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 943.
49. A number of nonunion employers have established such systems. See, e.g.,
Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1071-72, 1076-77 (Md. 1991)
(concerning charges an employee brought before a hospital's unilaterally created
grievance committee). Indeed, in a state that has adopted the Uniform Employment
Termination Act, which provides for arbitration of dismissals from employment, MODEL
EMPLOYMENTTERMINATION ACT §§ 5-6, 7AU.L.A. 67 (Supp. 1992),the Page andSherrick
proposal arguably would require exhaustion of that alternate means of adjustment as
well before the employee could resort to Board processes. Because the UAW has been
so supportive of employer programs to co-opt employees into "co-operating" with
management, see generally MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND
THE TEAM CONCEPT 3-4, 6 (1988), it is perhaps not surprising that UAW lawyers would
be willing to extend Collyer and Spielberg beyond collectively bargained grievance
procedures.
50. Page and Sherrick ask why I do not regard the DFR as a sufficient protection
against the effect that improper grievance handling might have on ULP matters that
are deferred to arbitration. Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 940. They err in stating
that I did not address this issue; I argued that the DFR provides unions with protection
against liability when they fail to process grievances for a variety of reasons that the
law deems legitimate. These reasons not to process grievances, although sensible for
a collective representative in apportioning the contractual rights that it has negotiated,
are not a sufficient justification for the sacrifice of statutory rights. Levy, supra note
9, at 534-35, 543. But there is also another reason to object to application in the ULP
context of the two-tier system that already applies to the enforcement of contractual
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In an attempt to distinguish intraunion appeals from
unorganized employers' unilaterally adopted grievance proce-
dures, Page and Sherrick argue that intraunion appeals are
worthy of deference because democratically elected officials
have an incentive to be fair to intraunion appellants because
a failure to be fair could cause them to be voted out of of-
fice. 51 This argument suffers from a number of flaws. First,
just as Page and Sherrick agree that the extent of deference
must depend on the quality of the particular appellate proce-
dure,5 2 so, under this argument, would the Board presumably
be compelled to review the extent to which the union oper-
ates in a democratic fashion: it would need to evaluate
whether there is a realistic prospect of a rank-and-file
rebellion forcing the incumbents from office. It is hard to
imagine a factual question to whose resolution the NLRB is
less suited. Second, because the purpose of the DFR is to
protect the politically unpopular and minorities within the
union against mistreatment in the grievance procedure, the
democratic process cannot be invoked as a basis for subjecting
those who allege that they were the victims of mistreatment to
an intraunion appeal. And third, it is doubtful that the
quality of intraunion appeals in DFR or other cases is an
issue that is any more likely to spur rank-and-file efforts to
seek new union leaders than the quality of administrative or
judicial treatment of the victims of civil rights or civil
liberties violations is likely to spur efforts to replace public
officials. Thus, just as there is no general requirement that
administrative or judicial appeals be exhausted before a
complaint may be filed against a public official,' the demo-
cratic check on union government is no reason to require
intraunion appeals before a claim may be pursued against
the union.
rights in a hybrid suit, whereby the employee must establish a breach of the DFR
before she is entitled to proceed for breach of contract against the employer. If that
regime comes to apply to ULP charges, then to seek redress against an employer's ULP
the employee must show that the union breached its DFR in presenting (or failing to
present) the grievance to arbitration. In that case, one wonders whether, as I argued
in Deferral and the Dissident, see id. at 543-44 n.349, the remedial aspects of hybrid
litigation might also be applied, whereby the union bears a portion of the employer's
back-pay liability, see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. Page and Sherrick
ignore this possible consequence of the establishment of such a regime for ULP charges.
51. Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 951.
52. Id. at 942.
53. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975) (noting that § 1983 actions are not
required to demonstrate the exhaustion of state remedies).
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In the final analysis, both public and private entities have
a variety of incentives to redress their own wrongdoing. We
may assume, as Page and Sherrick do, that business entities
will be more influenced by the possible impact of a perception
of unfairness on their profitability, while union leaders, like
public officials, may be more influenced by a possible impact
on their electability. One may well debate whether "voice" or
"exit" is the more potent incentive in a particular context, 4
but the mere prospect that incentives other than the outcome
of litigation may avoid the need for litigation is not a sound
reason for affording certain defendants the protection either
of an exhaustion requirement or of deference to the outcome
of a unilateral system of appeals.'
Nor are the ripeness and section 101(a)(4) arguments
sound. First, although some decisions hold, as Page and
Sherrick point out, that the hybrid DFR cause of action does
not "accrue" for statute of limitations purposes until the
member has exhausted his intraunion remedies,' that is
simply the consequence of a general rule requiring exhaus-
tion in such cases. 7 The Page and Sherrick argument
54. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 7-11 (1984).
55. If the political incentives operated in addition to the same financial incentives
that operate on businesses, then it could be argued, as Page and Sherrick seem to, that
leaders subject to removal in elections are necessarily more likely to have fair appeal
procedures. See Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 946. Unfortunately, union leaders
are frequently oblivious to the financial consequences for the union of their mistreat-
ment of dissidents and of the litigation that ensues, and so the political incentive, if it
is a realistic incentive at all, replaces rather than supplements the financial incentive.
56. See, e.g., Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 685 (1981).
Although the case cited, Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir.
1989), does not actually support that proposition, other cases do. See, e.g., Dement v.
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 845 F.2d 451, 460 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that an employee's cause of action accrues when the grievance procedure has
been exhausted or otherwise breaks down to the employee's disadvantage).
57. Indeed, the more common analysis, which seems to me to be the better one, is
to accord a tolling effect to intraunion appeals. See, e.g., Trent v. International Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 818 F.2d 1537, 1546-48 (1 1th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds,
488 U.S. 1025 (1989); Hester v. Bolger, 837 F.2d 657,659 (4th Cir. 1988); Frandsen v.
BRAC, 782 F.2d 674, 681 (7th Cir. 1986).
Treatment of the issue as one of ripeness or finality also leads to absurd results.
Using that premise, one could argue that the discharge is not "final so long as an
unorganized employer has the option to reverse its own decision to fire somebody,
because, for example, the employer ultimately is persuaded that its managers made a
mistake. Yet that proposition was rejected in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 260-61 (1980). The finality argument was advanced by the AFL-CIO, as amicus
curiae in Clayton, as a reason to require exhaustion. 451 U.S. at 697 & n.*. Although
the Court did not squarely address the issue, the majority opinion proceeded on the
assumption that exhaustion was a means to obtain "relief' from the employer's and
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depends on the desirability of extending the judicial ex-
haustion requirement to the NLRB context; the invocation of
terms like "ripeness" and "finality" do not aid their analysis.
Second, there are significant differences between the
judicial process and the NLRB administrative process that
make it neither necessary nor desirable to extend section
101(a)(4)'s exhaustion rule to the NLRB.' Perhaps the most
important difference is that, unlike a lawsuit in federal court
where the formal proceedings begin immediately upon the
filing of a complaint, an NLRB charge is really no more than
a request to the NLRB's Regional Director that he investi-
gate and consider filing a complaint.59 The Regional Director
then contacts the party that is charged with a violation and
elicits its side of the story;' normally, the respondent also is
given an opportunity to admit that it made a mistake and
correct the error."1 Only if the Regional Director concludes,
after investigation, that the charging party has a valid claim
and informed adjustment is unsuccessful, is a complaint
issued and an adjudicatory proceeding initiated.
62
As a union democracy litigator, I routinely insist that my
clients at least try to exhaust intraunion remedies, partly to
avoid unnecessary litigation and partly to induce the union
to tell me its factual and legal positions. I also consider the
prospective plaintiffs need for immediate relief in determin-
ing how long to wait before suing. Because the Board has its
own way of conducting this screening function when its
Regional Director decides whether to prosecute a ULP com-
plaint, it needs the exhaustion doctrine far less than the
federal courts do. This difference, in turn, helps explain why
the Board has not erred in refusing to apply to its own
proceedings the exhaustion doctrine recognized by the first
proviso to section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA.r3
union's breaches of their obligations, id. at 692, or to force the union to "rectify the...
wrong of which the employee complains," id. at 692 n.21; the finality argument
attracted the votes of only two dissenters, Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, id.
at 696-98 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. For an excellent discussion of the costs and benefits of exhaustion in the
judicial context, see Fox & Sonenthal, supra note 38.
59. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 40 n.7 (1987).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1991).
61. See id. § 101.7.
62. Id. § 101.8.
63. See NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S.
418, 428 (1968).
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Because I have qualms about the underlying DFR as
enforced by the NLRB, 64 I might not find the Page and
Sherrick proposal so troubling if it could reasonably be
limited to DFR charges against unions. In a "hybrid" DFR
action, the employee can prevail by showing that the union
breached its DFR and that the employer violated the CBA,
a violation that is actionable under section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act"5 (LMRA). The union and the
employer then share liability for the employee's monetary
loss, according to their respective responsibilities. 66 The
NLRB, by contrast, generally lacks authority to enforce
CBAs,67 and thus has no mechanism for holding the employer
liable for contract violations or for remedying the section 301
"half" of the employee's hybrid suit. Instead, it subjects the
union to full liability for the employee's lost back pay, at
68least if the grievance was meritorious. Of course, the
Board remedy provides certain advantages to the employee,
at least theoretically, because the employee need not find his
own lawyer to prosecute the case. 9 In addition, once the
DFR breach is established, the General Counsel need show
only that the grievance was not clearly frivolous; at that
point, the burden shifts to the union to prove that the
grievance would have been denied. 70  To the extent that
NLRB enforcement of a deferral doctrine would encourage
employees to pursue their DFR/301 claims in court instead
of before the Board, it would have the desirable effect of
shifting back-pay liability toward employers and away from
unions. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the Board
64. In my view, the union should not be held liable for back pay that should be
paid by the employer.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). The nature of the "hybrid" action is discussed in
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-65 (1983), and
Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 563-64 (1990).
66. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 222, 227 (1983).
67. Levy, supra note 9, at 523-24.
68. United Rubber Workers Local 250 (Mack-Wayne Closures), 279 N.L.R.B. 1074,
1074-75 (1986).
69. This advantage is largely theoretical. Recent experience reveals that, in light
of the budget cuts of the 1980s, a charging party often needs to have a lawyer to
prompt the General Counsel's lawyers to take action. In addition, when potential
hybrid cases seem meritorious, lawyers will be attracted by the availability of attorney
fees as part of the remedy. See, e.g., Self v. Teamsters Local 61, 620 F.2d 439, 444 (4th
Cir. 1980).
70. OCAW Local 5-114 (Colgate-Palmolive Co.), 304 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 139 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1036 (1991); United Rubber Workers Local 250 (Mack-Wayne Closures), 290
N.L.R.B. 817, 818-21 (1988).
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would be willing to acknowledge the disfavored status of
DFR claims as a reason for deferral: Page and Sherrick
certainly do not do so openly, and so are compelled to rely on
a variety of other reasons which cannot be confined to the
DFR context.
In their Response, Page and Sherrick divide the world of
Board charges into two classes, those involving contractual
rights and those involving statutory rights, and suggest that
only the former should be deferred.71 They go on to argue
that, although DFR claims are a sort of statutory right, DFR
claims belong to a lesser class of statutory rights that only
regulate the processes of relationships, and so ought to be
subject to at least some level of deference.' Perhaps they are
trying to articulate a reason for limiting the scope of their
deferral proposal to DFR claims.
But this argument simply does not work. First, it rests on
a distinction between contractual and statutory rights for
which both they and I have argued,m but which the Board
simply does not accept,74 and which thus can hardly provide
a basis for the Board to adopt their proposal. Second, even
they concede that the DFR is a statutory right,7' and that there
is no basis for according statutory rights greater or lesser
importance depending on whether they affect procedural or
substantive rights. Indeed, the distinction between process-
based rights and substantive rights that they draw in their
Article is reminiscent of the very distinction drawn between
NLRA rights and Title VII and Fair Labor Standards Act
rights, which Page and Sherrick do not embrace. Nevertheless,
proponents of deferral invoke this distinction as a reason to
allow deferral of NLRA rights-even though Title VII and
FLSA rights may be pursued independent of contractual
grievance procedures.7' If there is any distinction to be
71. Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 930-35.
72. Id. at 946-49.
73. Page and Sherrick complain that I distinguish between individual and
collective rights, id. at 932, instead of using the contract-statutory distinction which
they favor. This completely ignores the extent to which my original Article is based on
the contract-statutory distinction. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 9, at 526 (distinction af-
fects argument based on statutory language and legislative history); id. at 534-51 (dis-
tinction affects argument based on policies of federal labor law).
74. Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 935.
75. Id. at 948.
76. See, e.g., Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1497-98, (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en
banc); id. at 1501-02 (Edwards, J., concurring); Calvin W. Sharpe, NLRB Deferral to
Grievance Arbitration: A General Theory, 48 0H1O ST. LJ. 595, 620-23 (1987).
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drawn among statutory rights, other than those rights which
depend on a CBA, it is between waivable and non-waivable
rights. 7  Page and Sherrick's acknowledgement that the
union cannot waive the DFR in collective bargaining 78 pre-
cludes them from basing the extension of the deferral
doctrine to DFR claims on distinctions within the hierarchy
of statutory claims.
Finally, the DFR cannot be distinguished from other
statutory duties on the ground that it merely demands good
faith or rationality in process. That may be a fair character-
ization of the aspect of the DFR standard that forbids
arbitrary or perfunctory processing of grievances, but it does
not apply to the portion of the DFR that forbids discrimina-
tion on an impermissible basis. Thus, at best, the Page and
Sherrick proposal would allow deferral of only those DFR
claims that were limited to "arbitrariness." However, DFR
claims do not come neatly packaged as "arbitrary" versus
"discriminatory"; the determination of which sort of claim is
strongest often can be made only once the case has been in
litigation. Yet an employee needs to know at the outset
whether exhaustion will be required. In these circumstances,
it is not clear that such a limited exhaustion doctrine is
worth the effort that would be required to divide DFR
charges according to the type of DFR violation involved.
In summary, the reasons Page and Sherrick give for their
proposal do not carry the day. Thus, the Board's failure to
extend the Collyer rule to require that DFR charges against
unions be submitted first to an intraunion appeal is not
based on an "indefensible double standard,"' but instead
recognizes the differences between the two kinds of charges
and the two kinds of procedures.
77. See Hammontree, 925 F.2d at 1501-02 (Edwards, J., concurring); Plumbers
Local 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744, 750-51 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Michael C. Harper, Union
Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part II, A Fresh Approach to Board
Deferral to Arbitration, 4 INDUS. REL. LJ. 680, 685-87 (1981).
78. Page & Sherrick, supra note 17, at 942.
79. See Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 687.

